Diplomacy (Touchstone Book)

If I could give Kissinger's Diplomacy 10 stars, I certainly would. This book is extremely well written. I was amazed at how well Henry Kissinger explained 300 years of Western history and diplomacy. Because the book is so well written, I would recommend it to folks interested in history, political science, international relations, or for just interesting reading of a good book. I found the early chapter on Woodrow Wilson's approach to American exceptionalism, which included our native idealism, collaborative successes, and mutual security and multilateral action in international affairs to be very insightful and Kissinger returns to these concepts again and again in his analysis of statescraft. Likewise in this early chapter he contrasts Wilson to Theodore Roosevelt's philosophy of action only with clear national interests in mind, a world of realpolitik. He also explains balance of power approaches and adequately demonstrated the barriers, benefits, consequences, and downside of each of these approaches. After reading this 800 page book, I am ready to sit down and start reading again. It is really that good. There are numerous highlights but I will share a few with you. His chapter on Richelieu and Louis XIV demonstrated how Richelieu created the first modern state to emerge from the Middle Ages. Richelieu acted to consolidate power for the French king which ran counter to the mind set of the Middle Ages. Unfortunatley, as Kissinger demonstrates, Louis XIV squanders this power with needless wars, for which his relative Louis XVI paid the ultimate price. One section of the book, regarding the Concert of Europe after the fall of Napoleon, reveals statescraft at the heights. Metternich and Talleyrand helped create a peace that lasted over 100 years based on realistic balance of power and alliances based on common values. The development of the German state under the power of Bismark compared to the downfall of France under Napoleon III was very interesting. Unfortunately the power of the new German state was misused in World War I. The sections on World War I demonstrated the pattern by which military decisions and preparedness outweigh and preceed correcting diplomacy. In this section Kissinger and Tuchman offer a common view of the origins of World War I. Kissinger and Tuchman however diverge when it comes to Vietnam. Tuckman's short crisp summary of the tragedy of Vietnam in her book The March of Folley is a very good summary, but Kissinger's chapters on Vietnam in Diplomacy certainly put meat on the bones of fact. Finally Kissinger's analysis of his years working with Richard Nixon were real eye-openers. Richard Nixon undoubtedly had considerable gifts in the area of foreign policy which makes the tragedy of Watergate even more sad. I just do not think anyone with half a brain would be dissatisfied with this excellent book.

This book provides an excellent introduction into Western foreign relations. Kissinger's writing style is very easy to follow and is not dense or overly academic. I highly recommend it for any student in an introductory international relations course or anyone interested in the history of Euro-American foreign policy. Kissinger starts with the formation of the modern European state system during the 17th century. He uses Cardinal Richelieu, France's First Minister, as the frame to explain the foreign relations of the period. The author uses the pattern of analyzing foreign relations through leaders throughout the book. While this may seem too simplistic, which it is at times, it is effective. Considering the book is 700-plus pages already, the book would have to be longer to account for absolutely every factor in a particular period's foreign relations. I was surprised at how little Kissinger interjected his own (direct) thoughts into some of the chapters. I didn't think this was a flaw overall, just a surprise. However, Kissinger is able to blend history with astute foreign policy analysis that only he could bring as a prime mover of American international relations. As a WWII buff, I also liked how the author devoted a chapter to Soviet-German relations as well as relations among the European powers in the inter-war period. I was surprised to learn that at one time in the late 1920s Italy was allied with Britain and France to help contain Germany. The book contains numerous other anecdotes and passages that are left out of other books or classes that help explain the reasons behind certain historical situations. In closing, a fascinating read with great analysis for the student or anyone interested in foreign policy. The lengthy book must simplify certain aspects, but the author includes an extensive bibliography for further reading or research. Overall an excellent read.

Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger Simon and Schuster, 1994 912 pages. In his capacity as both the National Security Advisor and as the Secretary of State for two different presidents Henry Kissinger redefined the nature and scope of American diplomacy. He served in the most tumultuous administration of the twentieth century yet managed to invigorate foreign policy in what was also the nadir of executive prestige. With Richard Nixon he formulated a grand strategy based on the twin principles of Wilsonian idealism and European realpolitik that led to a period of geopolitical stability in the midst of America's extrication from the Vietnam quagmire. The Nixon-Kissinger team reshaped the nature of Soviet-American relations and introduced a period of détente using triangular diplomacy and the concept of linkage. As both an academic and as a practitioner of the art, Kissinger describes in his book the evolution and philosophical heritage of American diplomacy and its impact on global and regional stability during its rapid ascendancy as a superpower in the twentieth century. Kissinger provides both the casual reader and the foreign policy maven a refreshing history of American foreign policy as a reflection of its uniquely benign belief in its own exceptionalism. In Diplomacy Kissinger lists two primary schools of thought that govern the conduct and define the characteristics of foreign policy. European diplomacy in its current form traces its roots to Cardinal Richelieu and the primacy of the state. Raison d'etat radically altered international relations because it provided the philosophical justification towards the secularization of national interest. No longer under the suffocating aegis of the church, nations shrugged off idealistic endeavors in favor of policies that provided tangible benefits. The Treaty of Westphalia introduced the modern state system and ushered in a tumultuous period due to the lack of a confluence of common interests and a shared system of values in the concert of nations. Following the chaos of the Napoleonic Wars Metternich presided over a period of relative stability in Europe by positioning the decaying Austrian Empire as the fulcrum of the European balance of power. In his relentless pursuit towards the creation of a unified Germany, Bismarck dispensed with incremental gains and boldly asserted Prussian hegemony with a series of wars buttressed by peace settlements that consolidated his gains. Bismarck unhinged the Vienna settlement and dealt the existing balance a mortal blow. The cold calculus of raw power supplanted the Metternich consensus of legitimacy and in the wake of the entangling system of alliances that ensued, a European conflagration became almost inevitable. Indeed the singular practice of realpolitik, Kissinger asserts, "turned on itself" . Whereas realpolitik was distilled from the crucible of armed conflict, Wilsonian idealism reflected the triumphs of democracy and manifest destiny, together with the unshakeable belief in the exportability of the uniquely American system of values. While Kissinger lauds the style and substance of American diplomacy he nonetheless insists on the exercise of restraint governed by the realization of American national interest. According to Kissinger the most successful American statesmen were those capable of blending Wilsonian idealism with realpolitik. While Wilson provided the conceptual basis for American foreign policy in its ascendancy as a great power, he was unable to realize his objectives. A generation later, Roosevelt, borrowing heavily from Wilson's Fourteen Points, co-authored the Atlantic Charter and provided the framework for the United Nations. Roosevelt was successful because he possessed a surer grasp of the tenor of national consensus. He advanced Wilson's idealism and accepted the responsibilities of great power status yet accepted the territorial aggrandizement of the Soviet Union. The nation that implemented the Marshall Plan and sponsored the economic recovery of its former enemies was the same nation that unleashed weapons of unprecedented destructiveness on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Kissinger's analysis of American diplomacy during the Cold War is particularly noteworthy. From the prescient George Kennan to the equally remarkable Ronald Reagan, Kissinger chronicles the evolution of American strategies of containment. As a statesman he refrains from the insensitive criticism of an academic, and as an academic he bases his analysis on research rather than a political or personal agenda. Kissinger traces the theoretical origins of Cold War diplomacy in the Truman administration through its first tests in Greece and Turkey and armed intervention in Korea. He clarifies the persisting debate on Vietnam and rather than vilifying a single administration as is the popular pastime of many historians, he traces the efforts of four separate presidents and nearly twenty years of American involvement. It is remarkable, however, that Kissinger merely brushes over an event as significant as the Cuban missile crisis. Although Kissinger devotes the majority of his book to American diplomacy, he evaluates the actions of both allies and adversaries and their respective impact on the geopolitical environment. He supports Kennan's thesis that the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable but credits American diplomacy with limiting Soviet aggression and containing communist infiltration in regions vital to American interests. American diplomacy, Kissinger asserts, is the product of American exceptionalism and democratic necessity. Lacking the unifying force of an opposing superpower, the United States may again fall victim to the siren song of isolationism. Kissinger devotes the final pages of his book to a call for the development of a national interest. National interest will undoubtedly combine elements of realpolitik and Wilsonian idealism and define limits in order to prevent the exhaustion of American will and an overextension of American capabilities. National interest will also provide the requisites for unilateral action in a world increasingly suspicious of the military, economic, and cultural domination of the sole superpower. The current outlook is not auspicious. Western Europe, for the most part a steadfast ally during the Cold War, is breaking ranks and currently one of the most vociferous critics of American foreign policy. Future administrations face new challenges in an increasingly complicated new world order where simple geopolitical calculations are rendered useless and threats to American security span continents in the form of decentralized terrorist cells. However, America has answered challenges to the Wilsonian goals of peace, stability, progress, and freedom for mankind with resolve and moral conviction in the twentieth century. And though it may be a "journey that has no end," Kissinger's faith in the purpose and goals of American diplomacy remains unshakable.

The amazing thing about Kissinger is that he's still around and still writing, with a new book planned for May. I recommend his books On China, World Order, and A World Restored (?). Here in Diplomacy he makes a sweeping study of history, going back to the Holy Roman Empire. He goes through major turning points like the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the Congress of Vienna (after 1815), and the Treaty of Versailles (1918-19). These key moments helped to forge the balance of power and the world order of the modern nation state. There are many figures like Cardinal Richelieu, Napoleon, Metternich and Bismarck. Being from the Old World, Kissinger has more of an instinctive knowledge of obscure events from long ago, and how they have parallels in contemporary current events. Europeans tended to have more of a realist view of the need for the balance of power to maintain peace, while Americans have an idealistic sense of encouraging democracy and human rights around the world. Kissinger contrasts the idealistic Wilsonianism with the more realist views of Teddy Roosevelt. Although Nixon became less popular than TR, he had a similar brilliance in understanding the balance of power. But for most of the 20th century, idealism clearly won out over realism, with figures like JFK and Reagan. Once again, I don't understand why Kissinger is viewed as an amoral strategist. He clearly is seeking peace, but comes from an Old Europe view of the balance of power, based on deep knowledge of history. Kissinger gives an insightful psychoanalysis of Stalin and Hitler, along with laudatory studies of FDR and Churchill. Then there's a lengthy discussion of the diplomacy of the Cold War. As an intellectual, Kissinger tends to underestimate Reagan, but there's little doubt that his diplomacy worked. The history continues right to the New World Order of Bush 41 and the beginning of the Clinton administration. Many disagree with Kissinger, but the breadth and scope of his knowledge of the subject almost requires that one go through his book learning and life experience, if you want to learn about diplomacy.

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The study of history often seems to be preoccupied with war. Henry Kissinger corrects the imbalance with his authoritative account of the people who ended wars and preserved the peace, from the time of Napoleon to end of the Cold War. The book is dedicated “to the men and women of the Foreign Service.” He starts with the Peace of Westphalia and the Congress of Vienna, which pacified Europe for more than one hundred years. In the twentieth century, he is obliged to recount more wars, which he attributes to failures of the Wilsonian approach, and then the mixed success of Kennan’s containment theory. Kissinger obviously prefers realpolitik, and he mocks the “theological” and “psychological” schools of international relations. He nonetheless admires the United States for its idealistic approach, conceding that no other approach is compatible with America’s core values. The material on New World Order feels dated, but still a good analysis considering the book came out in 1994. As a history book, Diplomacy amply demonstrates the importance of studying how peace has been maintained in the past, that we may have more of it in future.

Kissinger's review of international diplomacy is a deep and abiding analysis of what has happened in the western world since the 17th century and the beginnings of the European balance of power system. Kissinger works toward the modern world of international interactions (his book was published in 1994) and America's role in forming and then surviving (so far) in this system. He explains the complex workings of the international order in fundamental terms. For example, discussing the problems at Versailles, "European style diplomacy presumes that national interests have a tendency to clash, and views diplomacy as the means for reconciling them. Wilson, on the other hand, considered international discord the result of 'clouded thinking,' not as an expression of a genuine clash of interests." Knowing this fundamental difference in world views it is much easier to understand the difficulties at Versailles. This book is filled with this critical kind of information. It is also filled with the Kissinger style of thinking. First the overview, then an analysis of the detailed problem keeping the overview always in mind. I suggest reading On China after reading Diplomacy. I read them the opposite way and I think I would have enjoyed On China even more if I had read this book first. AD2

I am just at 7% of the Kindle edition. I have a Hungarian hardcover translation but it was too big and heavy to carry around for reading. This is where Kindle's edge comes in. The book itself is a masterpiece, also a must have for international relations students, and I am happy to be able to read it in English on Kindle, tough I regret that there were two typos (Page 70 Location 1158, Page 69 Location 1146) in the first 7%... - there might also be others which didn't catch my attention. I do not know weather it is an OCR issue or those typos also do exist in the original US edition. Relative to word count the typo count is marginal. Whatever... just pour premium content items like this also to Kindle!